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Abstract 
Prosocial crowdfunding platforms can work through direct peer-to-peer (P2P) lending or 
through intermediaries, incurring different costs to borrowers and lenders. This study 
investigates the incentives of lenders and borrowers’ and how they would choose between the 
two types of platforms. We model the intermediary as a profit maximizer who filters projects, 
provides high quality borrowers with access to the platform, and ensures repayment rate to 
lenders. Our initial findings suggest that the introduction of direct P2P lending platform 
enables the intermediary to reduce its interest rate and to raise its screening threshold on the 
intermediated platform. The P2P lending platform also incentivizes more altruistic lenders to 
shift to the direct funding platform, which enables riskier borrowers to get funded. These 
findings suggest that the introduction of disintermediated P2P platform improves social 
welfare on the prosocial crowdfunding platforms. 
Keywords:  Crowdfunding, Field Partner, Kiva, KivaZip, Digital Intermediary 
Introduction 
Crowdfunding represents a paradigm shift for investing in projects. Rather than raising fund from 
venture capital or private equity, crowdfunding platforms directly connect entrepreneurs to individual 
investors. They could dramatically reduce the cost of capital, comparing to traditional fund-raising 
channels. This emerging mechanism is rather promising for donation-based platforms. For instance, 
Kiva.org is a non-profit platform that allows people to lend money via the Internet to low-income 
entrepreneurs in over 80 countries. Kiva’s mission is “to connect people through lending to alleviate 
poverty.” 
In the past several decades, financing for projects of poverty relief has mainly been through 
microfinance institutions (MFIs), which commit to provide financial services to low-income households 
that may be denied credit with traditional financial institutions. MFIs finance projects and charge 
interest to sustain themselves. Due to the high-risk nature of poverty projects, the interest rate of 
microfinance institution is considerably higher than traditional banks, in the range of 20% to higher 
than 50% (Morduch 1999). 
Kiva.org is one of the earliest and largest crowdfunding platform that that allows people to make small 
loans to people in poverty for their small business projects around the world. It operates by partnering 
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with local MFIs, i.e. field partners in Kiva’s term. When a project is posted on Kiva, gets funded and 
the loan is repaid with installments, the field partners are responsible to vet and present the project, take 
the fund, and monitor repayments. Kiva lenders do not earn any interest on these loans, while field 
partners charge regular interest rate on borrowers (averagely 34.65%). This high interest rate has been 
widely criticized. Kiva has been under tremendous pressure to get rid of “middlemen” and create real 
direct link between borrowers and lenders. 
As part of the efforts to cut borrowers’ costs through technology, Kiva later launched a new platform, 
KivaZip, offering zero interest loans to borrowers via direct transfer from the platform. On KivaZip, 
lenders can support borrowers from the US and Kenya. Kenya has M-Pesa, a mobile money system that 
allows anyone with a Kenya ID to deposit, withdraw, and transfer money easily with a mobile device, 
so direct disbursement and repayment is possible. There is no field partner on KivaZip, but each 
borrower is endorsed by a third-party trustee. A trustee can be any individual or organization that 
vouches for the character and creditworthiness of a borrower, but plays no active role in monitoring or 
assuring repayments, nor co-signs the loan. Although borrowers would have truly zero interest, the 
repayment rate on KivaZip (87.9%) is significantly lower than the original Kiva (99%).  
The newly introduced KivaZip model seems promising. The spirit of crowdfunding is rooted in the 
conversations and idea-sharing between entrepreneurs and funders. On KivaZip, Each borrower profile 
includes a private area for conversation and messages between borrowers and lenders. Those 
conversations can happen without an intermediary. The wisdom of crowds – a crowd of proper size and 
diversity can provide sufficient and unbiased information – helps funders make collective informed 
decisions in the absence of the field partners’ project monitoring and selection. However, bypassing the 
intermediary may also increase the risk for lenders. It is possible that borrowers who go on KivaZip 
might have been rejected by local MFIs. Without being scrutinized, vetted and monitored, borrowers 
are more likely to default. It seems that such screening and risk monitoring function of the intermediary 
cannot be easily substituted by technology.  
In this paper, we examine the original Kiva model (the intermediated platform alone) and the new 
KivaZip model (co-existence of the intermediated and P2P crowdfunding platforms). We ask the 
following research questions: How does the newly launched P2P platform affect the original 
intermediated business model on the crowdfunding platform? Will lenders and borrowers be better off 
in the presence of both platforms? How would lenders and borrowers choose between the two types of 
platforms? Our analytic model explicates the role of the intermediary, as well as the impact of P2P 
funding on the prosocial crowdfunding platform. 
Literature 
Several types of funding mechanisms have been studied in the crowdfunding literature: loan-based (Lin 
and Viswanathan 2013), reward-based (Agarwal et al. 2011), equity-based and donation-based (Burtch 
et al. 2014a). Prior research on donation-based crowdfunding has examined the impact of geographic, 
social, economic and demographic characteristics on fundraising success. Lin and Viswanathan (2013) 
find evidence of an apparent home bias. Agarwal et al. (2011) suggest lenders’ aversion to geographic 
distance. Using Kiva data, Burtch et al. (2014b) conclude that pro-social lenders prefer to contribute 
funds locally and to culturally similar others. 
Literature in other disciplines has also studied factors that affect charity fundraising success. 
Psychologists have demonstrated that individuals are more likely to support borrowers in need when 
they can empathize (Piff et al. 2010), or when they view themselves as part of the same “in-group” 
(Baron and Szymanska 2011). Beyond these “soft” factors, studies have confirmed that donors consider 
rationally about risk factors, such as credit rating, debt-to-income ratio, and the number of 
delinquencies. Since Kiva offers no financial return, we only consider lenders’ psychological and social 
motivations rather than the monetary incentives.   
Our model is also related to the literature on price discrimination. Current theories suggest that 
consumers can be segmented into two groups who have different preferences for quality (Varian 1985, 
Tirole 1988, Inderst, and Shaffer 2009). DeGraba (1990) demonstrates similar results for markets with 
intermediary. Diamond (1982) provides a general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving 
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incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. We complement this line of research by showing 
the intermediary’s role of market segmentation in the presence of P2P direct lending. 
The Model 
We consider the operation of two platforms in the crowdfunding market, Kiva and KivaZip. Kiva has a 
field partner that monitors the projects funded on the platform and charges an interest rate 𝑟, thus is an 
intermediated platform, while KivaZip support P2P direct lending. Each borrower needs $1 loan. Each 
lender lends $1. Since the lender does not charge interest, she gets back $1 if the project is successful 
is 0 otherwise. 
We denote the expected return on Kiva as 𝑘 and that on KivaZip as 𝑧. Because the field partner monitors 
the repayment of loans, the repayment rate is higher on Kiva than KivaZip. So 𝑘 > 𝑧 in general. Also, 
because lenders use their fund paid back by the borrowers to fund other projects, in equilibrium the 
probability of funding equals to the repayment rate. Therefore, 𝑘 and 𝑧 are the average repayment rates 
(and the probabilities of funding) on Kiva and Zip, respectively. 
Lenders’ utility consists of two parts: leading utility and altruism utility. We assume that the lenders 
have heterogeneous lending utility 𝑣, where 𝑣 ∈ 𝑈[0,1], and heterogeneous altruism level 𝛼, where 𝛼 ∈
𝑈[0,1], both from a uniform distribution. Lenders on Kiva only get base lending utility 𝑣. We assume 
that the lender’s utility on Kiva is 
𝑈𝑘 = 𝑣 + 𝑘 − 1 
Lenders on KivaZip enjoy an additional altruism utility 𝛼𝑣. We assume the higher the base lending 
utility, the higher the altruism utility. Hence, the lender’s utility on Zip is 
𝑈𝑧 = (1 + 𝛼)𝑣 + 𝑧 − 1 
Borrowers have different repayment ability 𝜃, 𝜃 ∈ 𝑈[0,1], which can also be interpreted as the success 
probability of each borrower’s project. The project, if successful, will generate net gain 𝑔, which can 
be understood as the return 1 + 𝑔 subtracts the project cost 1. In the presence of both Kiva and KivaZip, 
borrowers who are qualified to raise fund on Kiva can choose one of them to participate. The tradeoff 
is that, they may have higher likelihood of getting funded on Kiva, although it is more expensive. 
Borrowers who are not qualified to raise fund on Kiva (due to the field partner’s screening) will choose 
to borrow on the KivaZip platform. 
Equilibrium Analysis 
To establish a benchmark analysis, we first develop an intermediated model to represent Kiva’s 
operation before KivaZip was introduced. We then analyze the co-existence of the intermediated and 
P2P platform, which is the current business model. 
The Intermediated Model 
The timing is as follows on the Kiva platform. First, the field partner announces interest rate 𝑟 and 
screens borrowers on Kiva. Then lenders lend on Kiva and borrowers on Kiva get funded. If the project 
is successful, borrowers replay the loan back to Kiva. 
We assume the field partner screen the borrowers such that the high quality borrowers whose success 
probability is higher than 𝜃 will be listed on Kiva. So a total of (1 − 𝜃) borrowers will be listed on the 
platform. With probability 𝑘 the borrower gets funded. The platform average success rate or repayment 
rate is determined by the average repayment ability of borrowers on the platform. The average 
repayment rate on kiva is 𝑘 =
1+𝜃
2
. Because the field partner’s revenue is linear in 𝑟, the field partner 
charges as high an interest rate as possible, so 𝑟 = 𝑔. 
We assume that the filed partner incurs a monitoring cost, which is an increasing but convex function 
of the total number of projects. In particular, we assume the cost to be 𝑐(1 − 𝜃)2. The filed partner’s 
problem is to determine the interest rate and the monitoring threshold to maximize its profit:  
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max𝜃 𝑘
2(1 − 𝜃)𝑟 − 𝑐(1 − 𝜃)2     (1) 
s.t. 𝑘 =
1+𝜃
2
 
   𝑟 = 𝑔 
The first term in the objective function is the expected profit, which is calculated as the funding 
probability 𝑘 times the expected demand (1 − 𝜃), times the repayment probability 𝑘, and multiplied by 
the interest rate 𝑟. The second term is the monitoring cost. Solving this optimization problem we have: 
𝜃𝑘 =
2√4𝑐2+8𝑐𝑔+𝑔2−(4𝑐+𝑔)
3𝑔
. 
The lender’s net utility of lending on Kiva is 𝑈𝑘 = 𝑣 + 𝑘 − 1 ≥ 0 . So lenders whose utility 𝑣 ≥
2𝑔+2𝑐−√4𝑐2+8𝑐𝑔+𝑔2
3𝑔
= 𝑣𝑘 will be willing to lend. Proposition 1 shows the market equilibrium outcome. 
Proposition 1 (Intermediated Model Equilibrium). On the intermediated platform, the intermediary 
charges an interest rate 𝑔, and screen borrowers with repayment ability higher than 𝜃𝑘to be funded on 
kiva, and the lenders whose lending utility is higher than 𝑣𝑘will be willing to lend on the platform. 
The Intermediated and P2P Model 
We next consider both Kiva and KivaZip. Because the lender’s net utility of lending on Kiva is 𝑈𝑘 =
𝑣 + 𝑘 − 1, and her net utility of lending on KivaZip is 𝑈𝑧 = (1 + 𝛼)𝑣 + 𝑧 − 1. The lender’s platform 
choice is determined as follows. 
Lemma 1 (Lender’s Incentive). The lenders’ incentive to lend on Kiva and KivaZip depends on the 
their lending utility and altruism levels: 
(i) When lending utility 𝑣 ∈ [0,1 − 𝑘), if the altruism level 𝛼 <
1−𝑧
𝑣
− 1, the lenders do not lend; 
otherwise, the lenders lend on KivaZip; 
(ii) When lending utility 𝑣 ∈ [1 − 𝑘, 1] , if the altruism level 𝛼 <
𝑘−𝑧
𝑣
, the lenders lend on Kiva; 
otherwise, the lenders lend on KivaZip. 
Lemma 1 shows that both the lending utility and the altruism level are critical factors that determine the 
lenders’ platform choices. Figure 1 illustrates the segmentation of the lenders. 
 
Figure 1: Lender Segmentation on Kiva and KivaZip 
Assume the field partner screen the borrowers so that only borrowers whose repayment probability is 
higher than 𝜃  goes to Kiva. So the average repayment rate on Kiva is 𝑘 =
1+𝜃
2
 and the average 
repayment rate on zip is 𝑧 =
𝜃
2
.  
With probability 𝑘 the borrower gets funded on Kiva. With probability 𝑘 the project is a success and 
the expected return is 𝑘𝑘(𝑔 − 𝑟). Similarly, there is probability 𝑧 that the borrower can get funded on 
KivaZip. After the project is funded, with probability 𝑧 the project is successful with gain 𝑔. Therefore, 
the expected return is 𝑧𝑧𝑔. The borrower’s incentive compatibility requires that 
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so that higher repayment borrowers prefer Kiva rather than KivaZip. The condition is 𝑟 ≤ 𝑔[1 −
(
𝜃
1+𝜃
)
2
]. Because the field partner’s revenue is linear in 𝑟, the inequality binds. Therefore, we have the 
following result. 
Proposition 2 (Field Partner’s Interest Rate Rule). The field partner charges an interest rate 𝑟 =
𝑔[1 − (
𝜃
1+𝜃
)
2
], which increases in the project gain and decreases in the lowest repayment borrower 
on kiva. 
Proposition 2 shows that the interest rate charged by the filed partner is a decreasing function of 𝜃. The 
higher the filtering criteria, the higher the repayment rate, and the lower the interest rate. The interest 
rate is negatively correlated with the repayment ability. On the other hand, if the average project gain 
is high, Kiva is able to charge a high interest rate. This is consistent with the observation that the filed 
partner would bear some repayment risks. The interest rate charged on the Kiva platform is a risk-
sharing rule that trades off the repayment risk and the gain of the funded project. 
The filed partner’s problem is to determine the interest rate and the monitoring threshold to maximize 
its profit:  
max𝜃 𝑘
2(1 − 𝜃)𝑟 − 𝑐(1 − 𝜃)2     (2) 
s.t. 𝑘 =
1+𝜃
2
 
         𝑟 = 𝑔[1 − (
𝜃
1+𝜃
)
2
] 
Proposition 3 (Field Partner’s Filtering Rule). The field partner only supports borrowers with 
repayment rate higher than 𝜃∗ =
8𝑐+𝑔
8𝑐+4𝑔
, where 𝜃∗ increases in the monitoring cost 𝑐, and decreases in 
the project gain 𝑔. 
Proposition 3 shows that, if the monitoring cost is high, then the filed partner would prefer to set a high 
screening criterion and support fewer borrowers. If the average project gain is high, than the field 
partner tends to support more borrowers. 
Proposition 4 (Intermediated and P2P Model Equilibrium). The market equilibrium is as follows:  
(i) Borrowers with repayment rate higher than 𝜃∗ =
8𝑐+𝑔
8𝑐+4𝑔
  borrow on Kiva and those with repayment 
rate lower than  𝜃∗ borrow on KivaZip; 
(ii) The field partner charges interest rate 𝑟∗ =
g(24𝑐+6𝑔)(8𝑐+4𝑔)
(16𝑐+5𝑔)2
; 
(iii) Lenders with lending utility 𝑣 ∈ [
3𝑔
16𝑐+8𝑔
,
1
2𝛼
) lend on Kiva and with lending utility 𝑣 ∈ [
1
2𝛼
, 1] lend 
on Zip. 
Comparing Proposition 1 and Proposition 4 we see the following impacts on Kiva platform after 
KivaZip was introduced: (i) the screening threshold on Kiva is increased; (ii) the interest rate on Kiva 
is reduced; (iii) more lenders shift to KivaZip. Importantly, some high-risk borrowers who otherwise 
would not be able to get funded on Kiva now get funded on KivaZip. These changes would lead to 
positive social welfare on the prosocial crowdfunding platform. On one hand, although there might be 
welfare loss by the reduced number of borrowers supported by Kiva, this is compensated by the increase 
in the average repayment rate so that the expected return would be higher on the intermediated platform. 
On the other hand, KivaZip is supported by the high altruism lenders on the platform. The direct P2P 
lending enables some high-risk borrowers who were not able to obtain funding and who had to pay high 
interests previously to gain access to zero-interest funds. The overall welfare gain on KivaZip is also 
positive.   
Conclusion 
The study enriches the literature on crowdfunding by examining two variations of the prosocial 
crowdfunding platform structures. Our analysis shows that the introduction of P2P direct lending is 
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beneficial for both borrowers and lenders. The co-existence of the intermediated and the P2P platform 
seem to be essential for the success of crowdfunding platform operations. 
We contribute to the literature on P2P as a market mechanism and its impact on traditional markets. On 
the one hand, with innovative payment technologies such as mobile payments, entrepreneurs may raise 
funds directly rather than paying the commission required by most platforms. In this study, we find that 
the introduction of direct P2P lending platform enables the intermediary to reduce its interest rate and 
to raise its screening threshold on Kiva. This creates a potential threat to the intermediary’s long-term 
survival. They need to think about ways to provide more value to borrowers and funders since the P2P 
direct lending would eventually will push them to make other functional adjustments on the platform. 
On the other hand, we find that the intermediary still plays an important market segmentation role on 
the crowdfunding platform. When the average project gain is not very high (these are often the cases), 
and there is risk of not getting back the repayment, the lenders would have less incentive to lend on 
Kiva. With the intermediation of the field partner, the borrowers are separated into two groups. The 
high-quality borrowers are able to secure the fund to the project, and the ability to pay back the fund to 
the lenders offers the lenders incentive to lend money on the platform. Although the low-quality 
borrowers are left out to KivaZip, some altruistic lenders are willing to take the risk to lend to them. 
Overall, the intermediary plays an essential and strategic role of market segmentation. By offering non-
zero interest rate fund, the field partner effectively screen and price discriminates the borrowers. This 
effectively solves the market failure issue under asymmetric information.  
Overall, the P2P platform incentives some lenders to shift their funds to KivaZip, which enables some 
high-risk borrowers to get funded. These findings suggest welfare improvement on the prosocial 
crowdfunding platforms. Despite the convenience and efficiency of P2P transactions, the crowdfunding 
platform needs to further consider how to more effectively mitigate risks and differentiate borrowers 
for sustainable developments.  
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